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Abstract—This paper investigates key generation performance
in environments with large scale fading including path loss and
shadow fading. The path loss is found to be affected only by
the distance between users and not secure for key generation.
The shadow fading effect is caused by large obstacles such as
buildings. The correlation relationships of the shadow fading are
modelled and demonstrated to meet the requirements of key
generation principles. Monte Carlo Simulations have been carried
out and validated that shadow fading-based key generation is
feasible and secure.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, key generation, large
scale fading, path loss, shadow fading
I. INTRODUCTION
Key generation from wireless channels has become an
emerging technique to establish cryptographic keys between
legitimate users [1]. Wireless channels can be modelled with
large scale fading and small scale fading [2]. Large scale
fading occurs when mobile users move across a large distance
and the signal is affected by path loss and shadow fading
due to large obstacles such as buildings. On the other hand,
small scale fading represents the constructive and destructive
aggregation of multiple signal components due to reflection,
refraction, and scattering in wave propagation.
The small scale fading is affected by the environment layout,
scatterers’ material and distributions, etc. These factors have
been exploited by key generation prototyped with Wi-Fi [3],
[4], and ZigBee [5]. All the experiments are conducted with
limited communication ranges, e.g., less than 100 m. However,
multipath leads to highly dynamic changes in channel phases,
which is very sensitive to the carrier frequency and poses great
challenges for key generation in frequency division duplex
(FDD) systems [6]. In addition, the correlation of channel
measurements is impacted by fast time-variant small scale
fading, which limits its application in vehicular networks [4].
In addition to the above short range communication sce-
narios, many IoT applications will operate in a much longer
range in the order of kilometers. This can be achieved by em-
ploying cellular networks such as LTE or low-power wide-area
network (LPWAN) techniques, e.g., LoRa and NB-IoT, which
are currently attracting much attention from both academia
and industry. The wireless communications in such wide areas
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will suffer greatly from the large scale fading. There have been
some practical explorations of applying key generation using
LoRa [7], [8]. A disc model is proposed to analyze the effect
of eavesdroppers’ location, where scatterers are uniformly
distributed within the disc [9], [10]. However, key generation
principles, namely temporal variation, channel reciprocity, and
spatial decorrelation, under large scale fading have not yet
been properly modelled and studied.
This paper investigates key generation feasibility and per-
formance when it is applied to large scale fading, e.g., ve-
hicular networks where small scale fading is averaged out.
We find that the path loss itself only depends on the distance
and cannot offer sufficient randomness. Fortunately, shadow
fading is correlated and affected by large obstacles such
as buildings. In vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications, it
is experimentally observed that moving vehicles will cause
shadow fading as well [11], which is different from small-
scale fading. Based on the comprehensive analysis on the
shadow fading correlation relationships, we show that shadow
fading-based key generation is feasible and secure and further
validate it via Monte Carlo simulation. The numerical results
demonstrate that legitimate users are able to generate keys
securely from shadow fading during the simulated period, and
an eavesdropper does not have a better correlated observation
on shadow fading than the legitimate users.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model is shown in Fig. 1, with two legitimate
users, Alice and Bob, and one passive eavesdropper, Eve.
Trusted/untrusted relays and multiple eavesdroppers are not
considered. Interested readers please refer to [12], [13] and
[14] for more information. A two-dimensional Cartesian co-
ordinate system is adopted. Without loss of generality, Alice
and Eve are configured stationary, located at (0, 0) and (0, yE)
with yE > 0, respectively. This is a reasonable assumption
as Alice can be a base station/gateway, which will usually
be fixed. At time t, Alice transmits a downlink packet to
Bob, who is located at (xB , yB). At time t + τ , Bob moves
to a new position (x′B , y
′
B) and replies an uplink packet to
Alice. They will repeat the above transmissions until they get
sufficient channel measurements for key generation. Eve will
not inject any packets into the channel but quietly record all
the transmissions.
The effect of the small scale fading can be averaged out
by means of filtering at the receivers, therefore, the received
signal power is mainly affected by the large scale fading,
including path loss and shadow fading. Path loss describes
the power decay due to the transmission distance and shadow
fading represents the power absorption by large obstacles [2].
By considering the popular log-normal shadow fading model
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Fig. 1. A key generation system with two legitimate users, Alice and Bob,
and one eavesdroppers, Eve.
and empirical path loss models such as Hata model, the
received power, Pr, in dB, can be written as
Pr = Pt −K1 − 10α log10(d)−K2 log10(fc) + ϕ, (1)
where Pt is the transmission power in dB, K1 and K2 are
constants determined by the environments, α is the path loss
exponent, d is the distance between transmitter u and receiver
v, fc is the carrier frequency, and ϕ is the shadow fading effect
which follows a normal distribution, i.e., ϕ ∼ N (0, σ2ϕ). We
assume all the links have the same standard deviation, σϕ,
ranging from 6 to 12 dB [15].
Key generation extracts the randomness from a dynamic
channel, hence the constant components in (1) do not con-
tribute. In particular, although the carrier frequencies of uplink
and downlink are not the same in FDD systems, they are
always fixed. We therefore analyze the variable components
of (1), namely P PLr = log10(d) and P
SF
r = ϕ.
III. PATH LOSS
During the uplink transmission (from Bob to Alice), the
components of the path loss at Alice and Eve can be given by
P PLr,BA = log10(d2) =
1
2
log10
(
x2B + y
2
B
)
, (2)
P PLr,BE = log10(d3) =
1
2
log10
(
x2B + (yB − yE)2
)
, (3)
respectively. The subscript ()uv represents a link from a trans-
mitter u to a receiver v. Because Eve is fixed, the variations of
P PLr,BA and P
PL
r,BE are only caused by the movement of Bob.
It is not secure for key generation, as will be analyzed below.
The partial derivative of P PLr,BA and P
PL
r,BE with respect to
xB can be written as
∂P PLr,BA
∂xB
=
xB
x2B + y
2
B
, (4)
∂P PLr,BE
∂xB
=
xB
x2B + (yB − yE)2
, (5)
respectively. Note that both (4) and (5) will always have
the same monotonicity, determined by xB . Accordingly, their
partial derivation with respect to yB can be given by
∂P PLr,BA
∂yB
=
yB
x2B + y
2
B
, (6)
∂P PLr,BE
∂yB
=
yB − yE
x2B + (yB − yE)2
, (7)
respectively. When yB > yE or yB < 0, they have the same
monotonicity; otherwise, they have the opposite monotonicity.
From the above analysis, we can conclude that the path
loss effect is deterministic and cannot be used for key gen-
eration. The user location is the only variable in a free
space communication or an environment with strong line-
of-sight, e.g., the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) air-to-air
channel. The eavesdropper can use other techniques, e.g.,
radar or ultrasonic, to localize the legitimate users, which will
compromise the key generation process.
IV. SHADOW FADING
Shadow fading is affected by large obstacles, whose location
and distribution are difficult to predict and replicate, especially
in dense urban environments. It is usually due to electro-
magnetic waves attenuated by obstacles, which is affected
by the size, shape, depth, material type, surface smoothness,
relative positions of such obstacles as well as the angles
of incidence/refraction [2]. According to empirical measure-
ments [2], [11], when eavesdroppers are located a certain
distance away, e.g., 20 meters, they get uncorrelated channel
observation. Shadow fading information is thus secure in this
sense.
Key generation relies on temporal variation, channel reci-
procity, and spatial decorrelation [1], which can be quantified
by autocorrelation, cross correlation between legitimate mea-
surements, and cross correlation between legitimate and eaves-
dropping observations, respectively. And the cross correlation
is defined as
ρ(s1, s2) =
E{s1(t)s2(t)} − E{s1(t)}E{s2(t)}
σs1σs2
, (8)
where E{·} denotes the expectation operation, s1 and s2 are
random variables. When s2(t) = s1(t + τ), it becomes the
autocorrelation.
A comprehensive feasibility analysis on the correlation
modelling of shadow fading can be found in [16]. This section
will first analyze these correlation relationships and then derive
the secret key capacity.
A. Correlation Relationship
1) Temporal Variation - Autocorrelation: The autocorrela-
tion of the shadow fading describes the correlation relationship
between the shadowing effects of the same link at two time.
The sample delay τ leads to a movement of Bob, ∆d, and the
shadowing effects are ϕAB(d1) and ϕAB(d2) in Fig. 1. The
authors in [17], [18] describe the autocorrelation function as
an exponential one, which can be written as
r(∆d) = exp
(
− ∆d
dc
ln 2
)
, (9)
where dc is the decorrelation distance, which is dependent on
the environment, e.g., a decorrelation distance of 20 meters
is applied in the vehicular environment [19]. The model is
validated by many empirical measurements with sufficient
accuracy [11], [20] and also adopted in this paper.
32) Channel Reciprocity - Correlation Between Uplink and
Downlink: Channel reciprocity indicates that the uplink and
downlink with the same transmission path and carrier fre-
quency will have identical features at both ends. In a TDD sys-
tem the channel reciprocity is affected by the sampling delay
between uplink and downlink in a mobile scenario [21]. The
cross correlation in this case is the same as the autocorrelation
coefficient, r(∆d). On the other hand, the channel reciprocity
in a FDD system is affected by the different carrier frequencies
separated by ∆f , and their shadow fading effects of uplink
and downlink are assumed to be correlated with a coefficient
R(∆f) [22]. In summary, the correlation coefficient between
uplink and downlink can be given as
ρ(ϕAB , ϕBA) =
{
r(∆d), TDD systems;
R(∆f), FDD systems.
(10)
A high cross correlation between the shadow fading of uplink
and that of downlink has been found by measurements [23].
3) Spatial Decorrelation - Correlated Eavesdropping Chan-
nel: Spatial decorrelation describes the correlation relationship
between the legitimate and eavesdropping channels, namely
ϕBA(d2) and ϕBE(d3) in Fig. 1. According to the modelling
based on the empirical measurements, it usually takes a new
approach from the autocorrelation modeling [16].
In this regard, model “0.8/0.4 RX” is a popular model,
which takes angle-of-arrival difference, θ, and distance into
consideration [24]. In more detail, such model is defined as
ρ(ϕBA, ϕBE) =
{
f(X,κ)(0.6− |θ|150 ) + 0.4, if |θ| ≤ 60◦,
0.4, if |θ| > 60◦,
(11)
where
f(X,κ) =
{
1− κ/X, if κ ≤ X,
0, if κ > X,
(12)
where X ranges from 6 to 20 dB, and κ = |10 log10(d2d3 )|.
Intuitively, the larger θ and κ, the lower the cross correlation.
B. Secret Key Capacity
As we mentioned in Section II, P SFr,uv = ϕuv . Therefore,
we can extract the randomness residing in the shadow fading
effect from measuring the received power. Because ϕuv fol-
lows a Gaussian distribution, P SFr,BA, P
SF
r,AB , and P
SF
r,BE will
also follow Gaussian distributions. Their mutual information
can be calculated as [25]
I(P SFr,uv, P
SF
r,u′v′) = −
1
2
log2
(
1− ρ(P SFr,uv, P SFr,u′v′)
)
. (13)
Because Alice and Eve are fixed, P SFr,AE will remain con-
stant, which does not include any randomness. When Bob
moves around, ρ(ϕBA, ϕBE) will vary its value. We take the
maximum value, ρmax(ϕBA, ϕBE), as the worst case. The
secret key capacity, defined per channel realization, can then
be given by
Cminsk = I(P
SF
r,BA, P
SF
r,AB)− Imax(P SFr,BA, P SFr,BE)
= −1
2
log2
( 1− ρ(ϕAB , ϕBA)
1− ρmax(ϕBA, ϕBE)
)
. (14)
When ρ(ϕAB , ϕBA) > ρmax(ϕBA, ϕBE), the Cminsk will
always be larger than 0. In this case, we will be able to
generate keys securely from the correlated shadow fading.
In order to collect random key sequences, legitimate users
can either use an optimal sampling interval [21] or employ
decorrelation methods such as principal component analy-
sis [26] to obtain the uncorrelated measurements.
V. SIMULATION EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
Unless otherwise specified, the following simulation setup
was used in this section. Alice and Eve were located at
the origin and (xE , yE) = (0, 100m), respectively. Bob was
originally located at (xB , yB) = (10m, 60m) and moved
randomly with a speed of v km/h.
A. Path Loss
We carried out two simulations to analyze the effect of
increasing xB (yB) on the received power and the results
are shown in Fig. 2(a). The monotonicities of the received
powers are deterministic, which validates our analysis in the
Section III. We conducted another simulation by randomly
changing the values of xB and yB , each with a step of
0.5 meters. The results are shown in Fig. 2(b), showing
ρ(P PLr,BA, P
PL
r,BE) = 0.8628. In most of the cases, especially
after the sample index of 200, Eve can get a highly correlated
observation of the channel that will compromise the security
performance.
B. Shadow Fading
We analyze the correlation between uplink and downlink by
taking TDD LTE as an example. The delay for transmitting
ACK/NACK ranges from 4 subframes to 7 subframes for the
downlink hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) and from
4 subframes to 13 subframes for the uplink HARQ [27]. Each
subframe lasts 1 ms, and hence τmin = 4 ms and τmax =
13 ms. When v = 60 km/h, a typical vehicle moving speed, the
distance is ∆dmin = τ ∗ v = 0.067 m and ∆dmax = 0.217 m.
The ∆d thus ranges from 0.067 m to 0.247 m in the simulation.
The variation of the mutual information and autocorrelation
coefficient against ∆d in a TDD LTE system is investi-
gated by fixing yE = 100 and the results are shown in
Fig. 3. Besides calculating I(P SFr,AB , P
SF
r,BA) using (13), we
also numerically calculated the mutual information by employ-
ing a k-nearest neighbor (knn) distances-based method [28].
The results match each other very well. We also calcu-
lated the I(P SFr,BA, P
SF
r,BE) using the knn-based method, and
I(P SFr,AB , P
SF
r,BA) > I(P
SF
r,BA, P
ϕ
r,BE) always holds in these
cases, which indicates key generation can be carried out
successfully, because the incurred distance ∆d is very small.
Similarly, we studied the effect of the eavesdropper location
on the mutual information by fixing ∆d = 0.067 m but
varying yE . As shown in Fig. 4, even when yE is as small
as 1, i.e., the eavesdropper is only one meter away from
Alice, I(P SFr,AB , P
SF
r,BA) is still larger than I(P
SF
r,BA, P
SF
r,BE).
This ensures Alice and Bob can generate keys securely.
The secure key generation can be achieved when
ρ(ϕAB , ϕBA) > ρ(ϕBA, ϕBE), which will be determined
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Fig. 2. Received power affected by the location of Bob. The initial coordinates
of the users were (xA, yA) = (0, 0), (xB , yB) = (10, 60), and (xE , yE) =
(0, 50). (a) Bob was moving towards x-axis or y-axis. xB = [−40 : 5 : 55],
yB = 60 and xB = 10, yB = [−20 : 5 : 70]; (b) Bob was moving
randomly, both in x-axis and y-axis, with a step of 0.5 meter.
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Fig. 3. Mutual information and autocorrelation against ∆d. (xE , yE) =
(0, 100) m, dc = 20 m.
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Fig. 5. ρ(ϕBA, ϕBE) when Bob moves. X = 6 dB, (xE , yE) = (0, 100).
(a) The distribution of ρ(ϕBA, ϕBE) versus (xB , yB); (b) The statistical
distribution of ρ(ϕBA, ϕBE).
by the relative locations of Alice, Bob, and Eve, and also
the movement of Bob. A site survey of the cross correlation
between ϕBA and ϕBE , i.e., ρ(ϕBA, ϕBE) when Bob moves,
can be carried out by simulation to reveal the statistical
distribution of ρ(ϕBA, ϕBE), and an example is exemplified
in Fig. 5. The site survey may not be practical in real scenarios
because Eve will usually hide its presence and location.
However, as observed in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, a site survey is
not a prerequisite because I(P SFr,AB , P
SF
r,BA) is always larger
than I(P SFr,BA, P
SF
r,BE) in the simulated period. As shown in
Fig. 5(a), when Bob moves further from Alice, ρ(ϕBA, ϕBE)
becomes higher, because both θ and κ approach to zero.
Therefore, Bob will only carry out key generation when it
is in the proximity of Alice.
Regarding FDD systems, their correlation relationship is
affected by different carrier frequencies. As shown in (10),
R(∆f) and r(∆d) have similar effects on the ρ(ϕAB , ϕBA),
therefore, the simulation under the FDD system is omitted for
simplicity.
VI. DISCUSSION
Consider a typical vehicular communication context with a
vehicle moving at a speed of v = 60 km/h and a TDD LTE
mode with carrier frequency fc = 2 GHz. The coherence time
5of the small scale fading will be in the order of
Tc ∝ 1
fm
=
c
v
1
fc
= 9 ms, (15)
where c is the speed of light. Compared to the minimum
sampling delay, τmin = 4 ms, the small scale fading is varying
relatively fast; it is thus challenging to obtain correlated
channel measurements and apply key generation in such a
dynamic scenario [4]. Shadow fading has a large decorre-
lation distance, e.g., 20 meters as specified in [19]. When
leveraging the data and ACK frames in TDD LTE systems
for key generation, the maximum movement ∆dmax is 0.217
m, which is much shorter than the decorrelation distance. A
high cross correlation between the shadowing fading can thus
be obtained.
On the other hand, shadow fading changes much slower
than small-scale fading, which results in less randomness
and hence a slower key generation rate. In addition, shadow
fading is coupled with small-scale fading, so additional signal
processing such as filtering is required.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated key generation based on the large
scale fading, including path loss and shadow fading. We found
that path loss cannot be used for key generation, because it is
deterministic with respect to the distance. On the other hand,
shadow fading is affected by large obstacles such as buildings,
and exhibits a good autocorrelation property. We modelled the
correlation relationship of the shadow fading among legitimate
users and the eavesdropper. We demonstrate by simulation that
legitimate users can carry out key generation securely in the
simulated period. Our future work will experimentally validate
the feasibility of key generation considering correlated shadow
fading.
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